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SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants Thomas C. and Bette C. Wettach appeal 
from an order of the district court affirming the bankruptcy 
court’s award to the bankruptcy trustee for various fraudulent 
transfers between 2001 and 2005.  The Wettachs challenge 
the bankruptcy court’s (a) allocation of the burdens of 
persuasion and production on the fraudulent transfer claims, 
(b) evidentiary findings, and (c) legal determination that the 
deposit of wages into an account held by the entireties 
constitutes the “transfer” of an “asset” under Pennsylvania 
state law.  Because we conclude that the bankruptcy court’s 
legal conclusions were correct and its evidentiary findings 
were not clearly erroneous, we affirm the order of the district 





A.  FACTS 
 
 Because the bankruptcy court has already detailed the 
extensive history of this dispute, see Sikirica v. Wettach (In re 
Wettach), 489 B.R. 496, 503-06 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013), we 
recite only the essential facts. 
 
The debtor in this bankruptcy case is Thomas C. 
Wettach, a former partner at the now-defunct law firm of 
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Titus & McConomy, LLP (“Titus”).  Prior to its dissolution in 
1999, Titus rented office space from Trizechahn Gateway 
LLC (“Trizec”) under a long-term lease agreement.  After the 
firm dissolved, Trizec filed suit in 2000 against Titus’s 
former partners for unpaid rent under the lease.  The 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Allegheny County 
found that Thomas Wettach and the other Titus partners were 
jointly and severally liable for $2,700,000, plus interest and 
costs.  Although the Pennsylvania Superior Court initially 
reversed the judgment as to Wettach, see Trizechahn Gateway 
LLC v. Titus, 930 A.2d 524, 539 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated his liability, see 
Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 976 A.2d 474, 481 (Pa. 
2009).   
 
Before the Trizechahn court entered final judgment on 
June 7, 2006, Thomas Wettach filed a voluntary Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition on October 14, 2005.  Wettach’s 
bankruptcy petition listed $3,551,500 in assets, including 
$2,951,500 in personal property, retirement accounts, 
insurance policies, and the contents of a PNC checking 
account held by the entireties (the “entireties account”) with 
his wife Bette Wettach.  App. 662, 664-67.  Wettach claimed 
all of this property as exempt under federal bankruptcy law 
and applicable Pennsylvania state law, primarily relying on 
the exemption for property in which the debtor holds an 
interest as a tenant by the entirety.  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), 
(3)(B); 12 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101(b).   
 
B.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 In order to reach at least some of these assets for 
distribution to Wettach’s creditors, the trustee of the 
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bankruptcy estate, Jeffrey Sikirica, initiated an adversary 
proceeding on October 15, 2007.  Following the dissolution 
of Titus, Wettach joined the law firm of Cohen & Grigsby, 
P.C., and earned wages that the firm directly deposited into 
the entireties account.  The Trustee claimed in his amended 
complaint that these deposits constituted recoverable 
fraudulent transfers since they “had the effect of shielding the 
Debtor’s individual compensation from the reach of his 
individual creditors . . . by converting it into entireties’ 
property.”  In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 505.  In particular, the 
Trustee alleged, as relevant here, two counts of constructive 
fraudulent transfers under the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “PUFTA”), 12 Pa. C.S.A. 
§§ 5104(a)(2)(ii), 5105.   
 
The bankruptcy court held a trial on these claims on 
November 30, 2011.  However, before the court could issue 
its decision, the presiding judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
Bernard Markovitz, retired.  The case was subsequently 
reassigned to U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Thomas P. Agresti.  
After the parties consented to the bankruptcy court issuing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law without the need for a 
new trial, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order 
on March 26, 2013, finding in favor of the Trustee and 
awarding a recovery of $428,868.12.  See In re Wettach, 489 
B.R. at 531.  On November 12, 2013, the bankruptcy court 
awarded an additional $37,139.01 in prejudgment interest, 
resulting in a total award of $466,007.13.  See Sikirica v. 
Wettach (In re Wettach), Bankr. No. 05-38188-TPA, Adv. 
No. 07-2519, 2013 WL 5999167, at *8 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
Nov. 12, 2013).   
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 The Wettachs appealed the bankruptcy court’s 
decision to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  The district court rejected each of the 
Wettachs’ arguments on appeal and affirmed the bankruptcy 
court’s decision.  See Sikirica v. Wettach, 511 B.R. 760, 773 
(W.D. Pa. 2014).  The Wettachs now appeal from the district 
court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s award. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(1).  “Because the District Court sat as an appellate 
court, reviewing an order of the Bankruptcy Court, our review 
of the District Court’s determinations is plenary.”  SEC v. 
Bocchino (In re Bocchino), 794 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132, 139 (3d 
Cir. 2012)).  “In reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s 
determinations, we exercise the same standard of review as 
did the District Court.”  In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 
F.3d at 139.  We therefore “review the Bankruptcy Court’s 
legal determinations de novo and . . . its factual 
determinations for clear error.”  In re Bocchino, 794 F.3d at 
380. 
 
The Bankruptcy Code grants the Trustee the power to 
“avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or 
any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under 
applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim . . . .”  
11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).  Pennsylvania state law permits a 
creditor to avoid a fraudulent transfer “to the extent necessary 
to satisfy the creditor’s claim.”  12 Pa. C.S.A. § 5107(a)(1).  
However, the creditor can recover only for transfers made 
during the four-year “lookback” period preceding the date of 
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filing the action.  Id. § 5109.  In this case, the bankruptcy 
court determined that the relevant lookback period ran from 
October 14, 2001, until October 14, 2005.  In re Wettach, 489 
B.R. at 509.   
 
Relevant to this appeal are the Trustee’s constructive 
fraudulent-transfer claims under 12 Pa. C.S.A. 
§§ 5104(a)(2)(ii), 5105.  As the district court noted, under 
both provisions, “a direct deposit of wages into a jointly held 
bank account is generally considered to be a fraudulent 
transfer if the debtor was [(a)] insolvent at the time of the 
transfer and [(b)] the debtor failed to receive ‘reasonably 
equivalent value’ in return.”  Sikirica v. Wettach, 511 B.R. at 
765.  Thomas Wettach’s insolvency is not at issue in this 
appeal.  However, the Wettachs vigorously dispute whether 
there was “reasonably equivalent value” for the transfers.  
Because “[u]nder the PUFTA, entireties account funds used 
to pay for ‘reasonable and necessary household expenses’ are 
not fraudulent[,]” Titus v. Shearer, 498 B.R. 508, 515 (W.D. 
Pa. 2013), they argue that the bankruptcy court erred when it 
permitted the Trustee to recover based on funds in the 
entireties account allegedly used to pay for “necessary” 
expenditures.  
 
The Wettachs purport to raise ten separate issues in 
their opening brief.  Appellants’ Br. 1-2.  In addition to 
challenging the allocation of the burdens of persuasion and 
production for the Trustee’s constructive fraudulent-transfer 
claims, they dispute various evidentiary findings by the 
bankruptcy court.  Id.  Furthermore, the Wettachs make a 
statutory-interpretation argument that the deposit of wages 
into an entireties account is not a “transfer” of an “asset” 
under Pennsylvania law.  Id. at 2.  However, two of the 
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Wettachs’ arguments are not developed in their opening brief:  
(a) that the Trustee breached his duties to the Court by failing 
to offer into the record an exhibit allegedly delineating the 
deposits into the entireties account, and (b) that the 
bankruptcy court erred by finding that the only deposits into 
the entireties account were Thomas Wettach’s wages.  
Because these claims were not timely presented, we hold that 
the Wettachs have forfeited them. 
 
For those issues not forfeited on appeal, we reject each 
of the Wettachs’ arguments and affirm the order of the district 
court. 
A. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT PROPERLY 
ALLOCATED THE BURDENS OF PERSUASION AND 
PRODUCTION FOR THE TRUSTEE’S 
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 
CLAIMS 
 
First, the Wettachs argue that the bankruptcy court 
“improperly shifted the burden of proof” to them to 
demonstrate that they used funds deposited into the entireties 
account to pay for necessities.  Appellants’ Br. 13.  We 
review the allocation of the burdens of persuasion and 
production de novo, cf. United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 
343 (3d Cir. 2000), and affirm the district court’s order 
affirming the bankruptcy court.   
1. Legal Framework 
 
We recognized in Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1446 (3d Cir. 1996), that, where state law 
provides the rule of decision, the allocation of the burden of 
proof is a matter of substantive state law.  This rule applies 
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even if, as here, the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is not 
premised on diversity of the parties.  See Hatco Corp. v. W.R. 
Grace & Co.—Conn., 59 F.3d 400, 406 (3d Cir. 1995).  
However, the PUFTA “is silent on the issue of the burden of 
proof for constructive fraud claims.”  Fidelity Bond & Mortg. 
Co. v. Brand, 371 B.R. 708, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2007); cf. 
Cardiello v. Arbogast, 533 F. App’x 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(same).  In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), we therefore 
proceed by “predict[ing] how the highest court of 
[Pennsylvania] would decide the relevant legal issues.”  Ohio 
Cas. Grp. of Ins. Cos. v. Prof’l Ins. Mgmt. (In re Prof’l Ins. 
Mgmt.), 130 F.3d 1122, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
On appeal, the Wettachs improperly conflate the 
burdens of persuasion and production.  Our case law is clear 
that these burdens are “two distinct elements of the burden of 
proof . . . .”  McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 
281, 287 (3d Cir. 2006).  Although the burden of persuasion 
“does not change at any time throughout the trial,” the burden 
of production “may shift from side to side as the case 
progresses.”  Pension Transfer Corp. v. Beneficiaries Under 
the Third Amendment to Fruehauf Trailer Corp. Ret. Plan 
No. 003 (In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp.), 444 F.3d 203, 217 
(3d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
The record shows that the bankruptcy court required 
the Trustee to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” all 
elements of the fraudulent-transfer claims, including a lack of 
reasonably equivalent value for the transfers.  In re Wettach, 
489 B.R. at 507.  The district court also recognized that the 
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Trustee retained the burden of persuasion.  Sikirica v. 
Wettach, 511 B.R. at 765-66.   
 
Ordinarily, this conclusion would end the analysis 
since this allocation of the burden of persuasion favors the 
Wettachs.  However, the bankruptcy court also placed on the 
Wettachs “the burden of producing at least some useful 
evidence” as to the uses of transferred funds.  In re Wettach, 
489 B.R. at 507 (emphasis added); see also Sikirica v. 
Wettach, 511 B.R. at 766 (affirming the bankruptcy court).  
And because the burden of production is itself a function of 
the burden of persuasion, the Court must address whether 
there was any legal error in the bankruptcy court’s allocations 
of both burdens.  Cf. United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 
243 (2d Cir. 1972).  For the reasons stated below, we 
conclude that there was no error. 
2. Burden of Persuasion 
 
The allocation of the burden of persuasion for a 
constructive fraudulent-transfer claim under the PUFTA is 
unsettled in this circuit.  We previously placed the burden of 
persuasion on the party defending the transfer to show either 
solvency or receipt of reasonably equivalent value by clear 
and convincing evidence.  See 718 Arch St. Assocs. v. 
Blatstein (In re Blatstein), 192 F.3d 88, 98 (3d Cir. 1999); see 
also Walsh v. Gutshall (In re Walter), 261 B.R. 139, 143 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001).  Normally, this precedent would be 
controlling, but other courts have nonetheless rejected the 
Blatstein approach as dictum.  See, e.g., Fidelity Bond & 
Mortg. Co., 371 B.R. at 721; Castle Cheese, Inc. v. MS 
Produce, Inc., No. 04-878, 2008 WL 4372856, at *24 (W.D. 
Pa. Sept. 19, 2008).  Those courts instead have allocated the 
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burden of persuasion to the party opposing the transfer to 
prove insolvency and a lack of reasonably equivalent value by 
a preponderance of the evidence.  See Fidelity Bond & Mortg. 
Co., 371 B.R. at 720-22. 
 
At least part of the confusion lies with a change in 
Pennsylvania law that occurred in 1993, when the state 
replaced the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance 
Act (“PUFCA”), enacted in 1921, with the PUFTA.  Cf. 12 
Pa. C.S.A. § 5101 cmt. (1).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
previously interpreted the PUFCA as shifting the burden of 
persuasion to the party defending the transfer in order to 
demonstrate either solvency or reasonably equivalent value 
by clear and convincing evidence.  See, e.g., Butler Cnty. v. 
Brocker, 314 A.2d 265, 268 (Pa. 1974); see also Elliott v. 
Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1996).  But when the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the PUFTA in 1993 
to replace the PUFCA, it made no mention of the burden of 
persuasion in the statutory text.  See Fidelity Bond & Mortg. 
Co., 371 B.R. at 717.  Nor has the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court yet addressed whether the PUFTA altered the burden of 
persuasion.   
 
We stated in Blatstein that our discussion of the burden 
of persuasion for a constructive fraudulent-transfer claim 
under the PUFTA was “not necessary for our result.”  192 
F.3d at 98.  Our analysis was therefore dictum.  We now hold 
that, were it to consider the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would determine that the burden of persuasion as to all 
elements of a constructive fraudulent-transfer claim under the 
PUFTA remains with the party opposing the transfer.  As 
relevant to this case, the Trustee needed to prove a lack of 
reasonably equivalent value for the transfers into the 
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Wettachs’ entireties account by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  We thus affirm the district court on this issue.  
  
Pennsylvania has codified its methodology for 
statutory construction.  See 1 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 1921-39.  The 
ultimate objective “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention 
of the General Assembly.”  Id. § 1921(a).  Lower courts 
addressing this issue have focused primarily on the legislative 
history behind the PUFTA.  See, e.g., Fidelity Bond & Mortg. 
Co., 371 B.R. at 717-18 (noting that Comment (6) to 
12 Pa. C.S.A. § 5102 describes the burden-shifting 
framework under the PUFCA as “an archaism” that “should 
not be followed . . .”).  And it is true that under Pennsylvania 
law “[t]he comments or report of the commission, committee, 
association or other entity which drafted a statute may be 
consulted in the construction or application of the original 
provisions of the statute . . . .”  1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1939 (emphasis 
added).  However, we find dispositive Pennsylvania’s 
mandate that “[s]tatutes uniform with those of other states 
shall be interpreted and construed to effect their general 
purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact 
them.”  1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1927 (emphasis added). 
 
The PUFTA is a statute “uniform with those of other 
states,” id., and we therefore interpret it in accordance with 
the laws of other jurisdictions, see Klein v. Weidner, 729 F.3d 
280, 283 (3d Cir. 2013).  The overwhelming weight of 
judicial authority on this issue supports placing the burden of 
persuasion on the party challenging the transfer to show a 
lack of reasonably equivalent value by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  See, e.g., Dahar v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 459 
F.3d 117, 123 (1st Cir. 2006) (New Hampshire UFTA); 
Pirrotti v. Respironics, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-00439, 2013 WL 
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951721, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 12, 2013) (Connecticut 
fraudulent-transfer statute); Floyd v. Option One Mortg. 
Corp. (In re Supplement Spot, LLC), 409 B.R. 187, 201 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (Texas law); Daneman v. Stanley (In 
re Stanley), 384 B.R. 788, 804-05 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) 
(Ohio law); Brandt v. nVidia Corp. (In re 3dfx Interactive, 
Inc.), 389 B.R. 842, 863 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) (California 
UFTA); Ellen Equip. Corp. v. C.V. Consultants & Assocs., 
183 P.3d 940, 945 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (New Mexico 
UFTA); Stone v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc. (In re Hennings 
Feed & Crop Care, Inc.), 365 B.R. 868, 874-75 (Bankr. C.D. 
Ill. 2007) (Illinois Fraudulent Transfer Act).    
 
We also observe, as persuasive authority, that, under 
the constructive-fraud provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B), the party opposing the transfer has the 
burden of persuasion to show the absence of “reasonably 
equivalent value” for the transfer.  See BFP v. Resolution Tr. 
Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 535 (1994); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc. (In re 
R.M.L., Inc.), 92 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1996).  We see no 
reason to treat the PUFTA differently than the Bankruptcy 
Code, particularly since claims under the former statute are 
likely to arise in proceedings governed by the latter.  
 
The district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy 
court’s determination and allocation of the burden of 
persuasion is therefore affirmed. 
3. Burden of Production 
 
The bankruptcy court stated that the Wettachs 
possessed the “burden of producing at least some useful 
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evidence to demonstrate how they spent the transferred 
funds . . . .”  In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 507.  Absent such 
evidence, the Trustee was “deemed to have met his burden of 
proof as to reasonably equivalent value.”  Id.  The bankruptcy 
court therefore created a rebuttable presumption that funds 
transferred into an entireties account are not in exchange for 
reasonably equivalent value.  The effect of this rebuttable 
presumption was to shift to the Wettachs “the burden of 
producing sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed fact.”  
See McCann, 458 F.3d at 288.  
 
The bankruptcy court did not specify the type of 
presumption it imposed, but we have interpreted 
Fed. R. Evid. 301, which applies in bankruptcy proceedings, 
as implementing a Thayer, or “bursting bubble,” theory of 
presumptions.  See McCann, 458 F.3d at 287-88; cf. Official 
Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v. G-I Holdings, Inc. (In re G-I 
Holdings, Inc.), 385 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Pennsylvania courts have also adopted the Thayer model of 
rebuttable presumptions.  See In re Fink’s Estate, 21 A.2d 
883, 888-89 (Pa. 1941); Lynn v. Cepurneek, 508 A.2d 308, 
311-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).  Thus, once the debtor produces 
some evidence of reasonably equivalent value for a transfer, 
i.e., using entireties funds to pay for necessities, the 
presumption “disappears from the case.”  McCann, 458 F.3d 
at 288 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Whether the imposition of this presumption is correct 
presents a more difficult question than whether the 
bankruptcy and district courts properly allocated the burden 
of persuasion.  We have not been able to identify a consensus 
among other jurisdictions on the burden of production for a 
constructive fraudulent-transfer claim under either the UFTA 
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or the Bankruptcy Code.  However, some courts have shifted 
the burden of production once the trustee establishes a “prima 
facie case.”  See, e.g., Braunstein v. Walsh (In re Rowanoak 
Corp.), 344 F.3d 126, 131-32 (1st Cir. 2003); Riley v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Duplication Mgmt., 
Inc.), 501 B.R. 462, 485 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013).      
 
Nonetheless, because the inquiry turns on how the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide the issue, see 
Ohio Cas. Grp. of Ins. Cos., 130 F.3d at 1125, we find 
instructive the conditions under which that Court has 
recognized other presumptions shifting the burden of 
production.  Clearly, one purpose of a presumption “is [] to 
direct a party to come forward with the evidence . . . .”  Rice 
v. Shuman, 519 A.2d 391, 395 (Pa. 1986).  Such information-
forcing may be necessary if a party has “peculiar means of 
access to the evidence, or peculiar knowledge . . . .”  Waters 
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 144 A.2d 354, 356 (Pa. 1958) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Other 
grounds for recognizing a presumption include “the 
probability that the presumed fact is . . . likely to be true; the 
procedural convenience of presuming, without proof, a fact 
frequently not put in issue; the fairness of allocating the 
burden of production to the party having superior access to 
the means of proof; and considerations of policy which lead 
the courts to favor one contention over another by giving it 
the benefit of a presumption.”  Commonwealth v. Vogel, 268 
A.2d 89, 103 (Pa. 1970) (separate opinion of Pomeroy, J.), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Reilly, 549 
A.2d 503 (Pa. 1988). 
 
In this case, the bankruptcy court’s presumption serves 
an information-forcing purpose by requiring the party 
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opposing the fraudulent transfer claim, here the Wettachs, to 
come forward with information in their possession—i.e., how 
they used funds transferred into an entireties account.  In light 
of the aforementioned guidelines from the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, we hold that the bankruptcy and district 
courts did not err when they required the Wettachs to produce 
“some evidence” as to uses of funds in the entireties account 
to rebut the presumption against receipt of reasonably 
equivalent value.  Nor can the Wettachs claim any prejudice 
from this holding, which represents the consensus view of 
courts in this circuit.  See, e.g., Titus v. Shearer, 498 B.R. at 
519-20; Cohen v. Sikirica, 487 B.R. 615, 621 (W.D. Pa. 
2013); Cardiello v. Arbogast (In re Arbogast), 466 B.R. 287, 
308 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012). 
 
The order of the district court is therefore affirmed on 
this issue.   
B.  THE BANKRUPTCY COURT DID NOT CLEARLY 
ERR IN ITS EVIDENTIARY FINDINGS 
 
Having determined that the district and bankruptcy 
courts properly allocated the burdens of persuasion and 
production on the Trustee’s fraudulent-transfer claims, we 
also affirm the district court’s order affirming each of the 
disputed evidentiary findings of the bankruptcy court.   
1. Existence and Amount of Wages 
Deposited Into the Entireties Account 
 
First, the Wettachs argue that the Trustee failed to 
show the existence and amount of Thomas Wettach’s wages 
deposited into the entireties account.  The bankruptcy court 
found that the Trustee proved deposits of $933,472 during the 
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lookback period.  In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 512.  The district 
court then rejected the Wettachs’ argument that this figure 
referred only to gross, and not net, wages.  Sikirica v. 
Wettach, 511 B.R. at 767-68.  We agree with the district court 
that these findings were not clearly erroneous and affirm. 
 
As to the existence of deposits, the Wettachs admitted 
in their answer that Thomas Wettach directed the deposit of 
his wages into the account.  See App. 145 ¶ 24; 146 ¶ 26; 148 
¶ 36; 150 ¶ 51; 151 ¶ 55.  These statements “are considered 
judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party who 
made them.”  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, __ 
U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 n.6 (2013) (quoting Am. Title 
Ins. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988)).  
Furthermore, Thomas Wettach even testified at trial that his 
law firm made these deposits.  App. 333:6-:15.  This evidence 
is sufficient to support the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that 
the existence of deposits in the entireties account “is clearly 
established by the record.”  In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 511.   
 
With regard to the amount of such deposits, the 
bankruptcy court relied on the Wettachs’ tax returns for the 
years 2001-2005 to find “potentially actionable deposits of 
$933,472” during the lookback period.  Id. at 512-13.  The 
record shows that the Wettachs reported on line 7 of their 
income tax returns gross wages of $376,358 in 2001, 
$202,122 in 2002, $365,305 in 2003, $242,597 in 2004, and 
$216,334 in 2005.  See id. at 512.  Furthermore, Bette 
Wettach testified at trial that she did not earn any income that 
she deposited into the entireties account during this period.  
See App. 375:10-:12; see also App. 332:9-333:5.  In order to 
account for the Trustee’s burden of persuasion and the 
relevant lookback period, the bankruptcy court took one-half 
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of the strict pro rata amounts reported for 2001 and 2005.  See 
In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 512 & n.12 (noting that only 79 
days of 2001 and 287 days of 2005 fell within the lookback 
period).  Based on these figures, the bankruptcy court found 
that the Trustee showed deposits of $933,472 into the 
entireties account.  Id. at 513.1  The bankruptcy court’s 
method of calculation does not render this finding clearly 
erroneous. 
 
The Wettachs respond, correctly, that line 7 of their 
federal income tax returns reflects gross, not net, wages.  
However, as the district court noted, this fact also does not 
demonstrate clear error by the bankruptcy court.  See Sikirica 
v. Wettach, 511 B.R. at 767-68.  Schedule I to the bankruptcy 
petition reports average monthly payroll deductions of $8,500 
per month, or an average of $408,000 over the four-year 
lookback period.  App. 679.  The Wettachs provide no basis 
for disputing the accuracy of these figures, which are eligible 
for treatment as judicial admissions.  Cf. In re VanCleef, 479 
B.R. 809, 824 n.13 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2012); In re Bohrer, 
266 B.R. 200, 201 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001).  Even accounting 
for these payroll deductions, the record supports the district 
court’s conclusion that Thomas Wettach deposited $525,472 
                                                 
1 Our calculations, using the bankruptcy court’s own figures, 
indicate that there were $935,473.59 in alleged deposits over the 
lookback period.  We attribute the discrepancy to some 
combination of typographical error and rounding.  Regardless, 
because both figures far exceed the $380,253.87 in recoverable 
expenditures for non-necessities found by the bankruptcy court, In 
re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 520, any error is harmless.  Zolfo, Cooper 
& Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., 50 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 19 
in net wages into the entireties account during the lookback 
period.2  See Sikirica v. Wettach, 511 B.R. at 767.   
 
Nevertheless, the Wettachs dispute this otherwise 
straightforward arithmetic exercise by reference to an exhibit 
(“Exhibit 23”), which they admit was not in the record at trial.  
See Appellants’ Br. 14.  According to the Wettachs, Exhibit 
23 supposedly includes data sheets showing “all deposits and 
withdrawals into and out of the PNC entireties bank account.”  
Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).  These data sheets allegedly 
undermine the bankruptcy court’s findings as to the existence 
and amount of wages deposited into the entireties account.  
See id. at 17-18. 
 
Unfortunately for the Wettachs, Exhibit 23 is not in the 
record on appeal.  The Wettachs argue that the parties listed 
Exhibit 23 in the Joint Pretrial Statement and included it in 
the Notebook of Plaintiff’s Exhibits before the bankruptcy 
court.  Appellants’ Br. 14; Appellants’ Reply Br. 6-7.  But 
under Fed. R. App. P. 6(b)(2)(B)(iii), for an appeal in a 
bankruptcy case, “[t]he record on appeal consists of: the 
redesignated record [by the parties] . . . ; the proceedings in 
the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel; and a certified 
copy of the docket entries prepared by the clerk under Rule 
3(d).”  Neither party designated Exhibit 23 as part of the 
record before this Court or the district court.  See Wettach v. 
Sikirica, No. 2:13-cv-01822-NBF (W.D. Pa.), ECF Nos. 1-47, 
                                                 
2 Although the district court actually reports that there were 
“approximately $535,472 in [net] wages available for deposit into 
the joint account,” Sikirica v. Wettach, 511 B.R. at 767, the context 
of the decision suggests that the discrepancy is a typographical 
error.  Cf. Metal Founds. Acquisition, LLC v. Reinert (In re 
Reinert), 597 F. App’x 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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1-48, 10, 14.  The exhibit was also not part of the 
“proceedings in the district court.”  
Fed. R. App. P. 6(b)(2)(B)(iii).  To the contrary, the district 
court references Exhibit 23 only in passing and otherwise 
appears to have entirely ignored the document.  Cf. Sikirica v. 
Wettach, 511 B.R. at 766.  The bankruptcy court’s brief 
mention of Exhibit 23 in its opinion is likewise inapposite.  
Cf. In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 511.  
 
We therefore affirm the district court on this issue.   
 
2.  Reasonably Equivalent Value for Funds 
in the Entireties Account 
 
 Second, the Wettachs argue that the Trustee failed to 
show that the deposits into the entireties account funded non-
necessary expenditures.  However, because the Wettachs did 
not carry their burden of production on this issue, we affirm 
the district court. 
 
 As discussed above, see supra Part II.A, the 
bankruptcy court correctly required the Trustee to prove all 
elements of his fraudulent transfer claims by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  See In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 507.  
However, it also created a rebuttable presumption that funds 
deposited into an entireties account were not in exchange for 
reasonably equivalent value and thereby shifted the burden of 
production to the Wettachs.  Id.     
 
 The Wettachs produced no evidence to demonstrate 
how they spent the wages deposited into the entireties 
account.  The bankruptcy court even offered them a “dollar-
for-dollar reduction against any liability” for other deposits 
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into the account.  In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 507-08.  The 
court in fact did exclude from the Trustee’s potential recovery 
an inheritance from Thomas Wettach’s father.  Id. at 512-13.  
The only other potential source of funds that the Wettachs 
identify is $107,000 in pre-existing funds in the entireties 
account at the start of the lookback period.  Yet the sole 
evidence of these funds is Exhibit 23, which is not part of the 
record in this case.  See supra Part II.B.1.  Having failed to 
carry their burden of production and absent clear error by the 
bankruptcy court, the Wettachs have no claim for relief on 
appeal. 
 
 The order of the district court on this issue is affirmed.   
 
3.  Automobile Expenses 
 
 Third, the Wettachs argue that the bankruptcy court 
erred when it found that the Trustee could recover $76,975 
for non-necessary automobile expenses paid by the Wettachs 
during the lookback period.  The court reached this figure by 
strictly apportioning the total automobile expenditures3 of 
$134,706.02 among the Wettachs’ seven vehicles after 
finding that only three vehicles qualified as necessities.  See 
In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 515-16.  Because we hold that the 
bankruptcy court did not clearly err in its findings, we affirm. 
                                                 
3 The bankruptcy court stated that the Trustee sought “a recovery 
of $134,706.02 for automobile expenses . . . during the lookback 
period.”  In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 515.  But the Trustee’s Exhibit 
36 reports that automobile expenditures were actually $134,716.02.  
App. 735.  Assuming this discrepancy is due to a typographical 
error, the error is harmless since it is de minimis and favors the 
Wettachs.  Cf. SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort, Inc., 707 F.3d 
267, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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 Thomas Wettach listed seven vehicles on his 
bankruptcy petition as personal property and valued them at 
$12,000 each.  App. 699.  At trial, he also testified that this 
$12,000 figure was a “good average” for the vehicles.  App. 
300:4-:19.  Yet for the first time on appeal, and without any 
citation to the record, the Wettachs argue that the majority of 
their automobile expenditures were on two vehicles that the 
bankruptcy court allegedly found were necessities.  
Appellants’ Br. 21-23.  The fact that the Wettachs provide no 
evidence to substantiate this claim should be the end of the 
matter.  Cf. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc. (In re R.M.L., Inc.), 92 
F.3d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1996).  However, they also 
mischaracterize the bankruptcy court’s actual finding.  In 
particular, the court noted that it could find “no basis for 
deciding which of the vehicles should be considered 
necessities . . .” for the purpose of allocating expenditures.  In 
re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 516 (emphasis added).  This 
conclusion was not clearly erroneous in light of the 
bankruptcy petition and Thomas Wettach’s own testimony.  
Therefore, even assuming reasonable disagreement about the 
appropriateness of strict apportionment of the automobile 
expenses, the bankruptcy court’s finding that $76,975 were 
recoverable was also not clearly erroneous.  Cf. Publicker 
Indus., Inc. v. Roman Ceramics Corp., 652 F.2d 340, 344 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (“mere disagreement with the district court’s 
factual determinations” does not warrant reversal). 
 
 We thus affirm the order of the district court on this 
issue.   
 
4.  Home Renovation Expenditures 
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 Fourth, the Wettachs challenge the bankruptcy court’s 
finding that the Trustee could recover $167,297.65 in home 
renovation expenditures during the lookback period.  We hold 
that the bankruptcy court’s findings were not clearly 
erroneous and affirm. 
 
 The Wettachs do not dispute the Trustee’s claim that 
they spent $178,508.21 during the lookback period on home 
renovations.  These renovations included the addition of an 
art studio, home office, a fourth bathroom, a second garage, 
finished basement, and extensive landscaping.  However, they 
argue that these expenses were necessary in order to 
“complete” their home.  See Appellants’ Br. 24.  But the 
bankruptcy court found that the house was already “habitable 
prior to the commencement of the improvements . . . .”  In re 
Wettach, 489 B.R. at 517.  The Wettachs do not dispute that 
the house already had a living room, dining room, kitchen, 
den, four bedrooms, three bathrooms, and a garage.  See App. 
237:6-:17, 357:6-:7.  Furthermore, the bankruptcy court did 
reduce the Trustee’s potential recovery by deducting 
$11,210.65 in certain home renovation expenditures related to 
repairs, furniture, yard work, and tree trimming.  See In re 
Wettach, 489 B.R. at 518.  The Wettachs otherwise rely 
entirely on arguments divorced from the factual record on 
appeal and fail to demonstrate that the bankruptcy court’s 
findings were clearly erroneous.  Cf. United States v. Birch, 
591 F. App’x 54, 55-56 (3d Cir. 2015).   
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The Court affirms the district court’s order affirming 
the bankruptcy court’s award4 of $167,297.65 for these 
expenditures.   
 
5.  Payments to Bette Wettach for Household 
Expenses 
 
 Fifth, the Wettachs dispute the bankruptcy court’s 
finding, upheld by the district court, that the Trustee could 
recover $52,805 conveyed to Bette Wettach.  Specifically, 
during the lookback period the Wettachs transferred funds 
from the entireties account to Bette Wettach, who then 
deposited these funds into a separate jointly-held account (the 
“Dollar General account”), allegedly to pay for various 
household expenses.  See In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 519.  The 
bankruptcy court found that the total amount of these 
transfers during the lookback period was $148,505, of which 
$52,805 were potentially recoverable as non-necessary 
expenditures.  Id. at 519-20.  Because these findings are not 
clearly erroneous, we affirm.   
 
 We agree with the Trustee that the Wettachs’ argument 
borders on the incomprehensible.  Without any reference to 
the record, the Wettachs contend that average household 
expenditures paid by Bette Wettach were $2,750 per month.  
They then state that “[t]he total amount deposited during the 
lookback years totaled $146,405, a difference of $10,405 for 
non-necessities.”  Appellants’ Br. 26.  Presumably, the 
                                                 
4 We note that subtracting the $11,210.65 in deductions from the 
Trustee’s total figure of $178,508.21 in renovation expenses results 
in $167,297.56 of potentially recoverable expenditures.  Any error, 
presumably typographical, by the bankruptcy court is de minimis 
and harmless. 
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Wettachs intend to argue that over the 48-month lookback 
period, Bette Wettach spent an average of $132,000 [= 48 
months x $2,750 per month] in necessary household 
expenditures, meaning that the Trustee’s potential recovery 
should be limited to $14,405 [= $146,405 - $132,000], instead 
of the $52,805 awarded by the bankruptcy court.  Of course, 
they provide no support for any of these figures, and the 
Court declines the invitation to comb through the record in an 
attempt to disentangle the Wettachs’ reasoning.  Cf. United 
States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 216 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 
 By contrast, the bankruptcy court’s reasoning is 
straightforward and not clearly erroneous, even if it does 
suffer from minimal mathematical deficiencies.  Schedule J to 
the bankruptcy petition lists $10,110 in total average monthly 
expenses, App. 713, of which Bette Wettach testified that at 
least $1,950 comprised expenses paid by her from the Dollar 
General account, see App. 376:17-382:13.  The Wettachs also 
do not credibly dispute this $1,950 figure.  Over the lookback 
period, Bette Wettach therefore should have paid $93,600 [= 
48 months x $1,950 per month] in household expenses from 
the account.  Instead, the bankruptcy court found that she 
spent $148,505.  In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 519.  It would not 
be clearly erroneous to conclude that the difference of 
$54,905 [= $148,505 - $93,600] therefore corresponds to non-
necessary expenditures during the lookback period.  For 
reasons that are not clear from the record, the bankruptcy 
court instead awarded $52,805 in potentially recoverable 
transfers.  Id. at 520.  As the discrepancy is in the Wettachs’ 




 We therefore affirm the order of the district court 
affirming the bankruptcy court on this issue.   
 
6.  Balance of Funds in the Entireties 
Account at Filing 
 
 Sixth, the Wettachs argue that the bankruptcy court 
improperly awarded $39,264.25 in potentially recoverable 
transfers, corresponding to the balances of the entireties and 
Dollar General accounts on the date that Thomas Wettach 
filed his bankruptcy petition.  Because the bankruptcy court 
did not clearly err in its findings, we affirm. 
 
 The Wettachs dispute the bankruptcy court’s findings 
on two grounds.  First, they argue that the Trustee failed to 
identify the sources for these funds.  For the reasons stated 
above, see supra Part II.B.1, the bankruptcy court did not 
clearly err when it found by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Thomas Wettach’s wages were the source of these funds.  
Second, the Wettachs argue that because the funds remained 
in the accounts on the date of the bankruptcy filing, they were 
not spent on non-necessities.  The Wettachs failed to raise this 
argument before the district court, see Br. for Appellants, 
Sikirica v. Wettach, No. 2:13-cv-01822-NBF, at *17-*18 
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2014), ECF No. 4, and have therefore 
forfeited it on appeal here, see Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 
35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994).  Regardless, they also failed 
to carry the burden of production as to how the funds were 
ultimately spent.  See supra Part II.A.3.  Because they failed 
to provide such evidence, the Trustee carried his burden of 
persuasion.  See In re Wettach, 489 B.R. at 507.   
 
 We therefore affirm. 
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C.  THE WETTACHS’ DEPOSITS OF WAGES INTO AN 
ENTIRETIES ACCOUNT ARE TRANSFERS OF ASSETS 
UNDER THE PUFTA 
 
 Finally, the Wettachs argue that the deposit of wages 
into an entireties account is not a “transfer” of an “asset” 
under the PUFTA.  The district court considered and rejected 
this argument.  We review the issue de novo and affirm. 
 
 The PUFTA defines a “transfer” as “[e]very 
mode . . . of disposing of or parting with an asset or an 
interest in an asset.”  12 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101(b).  Likewise, an 
“asset” under the PUFTA is “[p]roperty of [the] 
debtor . . . [but] does not include: . . . (2) property to the 
extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law . . . .”  
Id.  Because Pennsylvania state law exempts wages held by 
the employer, see 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8127(a), the Wettachs 
argue that such wages are not “assets” that a debtor can 
fraudulently “transfer” under the PUFTA, Appellants’ Br. 27-
28.   
 
This Court interprets a state statute by “predict[ing] 
how the highest court of that state would decide the relevant 
legal issues.”  Ohio Cas. Grp. of Ins. Cos., 130 F.3d at 1125.  
Neither the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor the Third 
Circuit has addressed this issue, but intermediate 
Pennsylvania state courts have permitted attachment of wages 
directly deposited into an entireties account.  See, e.g., Stinner 
v. Stinner, 446 A.2d 651, 653 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).  We have 
recognized that decisions of intermediate appellate state 
courts are indicative of how the state Supreme Court would 
interpret state law.  See Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 
F.3d 239, 254 (3d Cir. 2010).  The intermediate courts’ view 
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also coincides with the weight of judicial authority on this 
issue.  See, e.g., Cohen v. Sikirica, 487 B.R. at 632; In re 
Arbogast, 466 B.R. at 310-12; cf. Kaler v. Craig (In re 
Craig), 144 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 
The Wettachs’ reference to Resolute Ins. v. 
Pennington, 224 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. 1966), is inapposite.  
That case stated, in dictum, that an individual could not waive 
his or her exemption from attachment as to wages.  Id.  It did 
not address the issue presented here, i.e., whether a direct 
deposit of wages into an entireties account can constitute a 
fraudulent transfer of assets under the PUFTA.   
 
The Wettachs also make much ado about the fact that 
Pennsylvania law exempts wages from attachment “while in 
the hands of the employer . . . .”  42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8127(a).  
Relying, without citation, on “fundamental commercial law,” 
they argue that wages directly deposited into an account 
“remain in the hands of the employer . . . until the funds are 
received by the bank . . . .”  Appellants’ Br. 28.  Yet the 
Wettachs ignore the broad scope of the term “transfer” under 
Pennsylvania law.  The PUFTA states that a “transfer” can be 
“direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, [or] voluntary or 
involuntary . . . .”  12 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101(b) (emphasis added).  
Thomas Wettach exercised control over where his employer 
deposited his wages.  Therefore, when his employer initiated 
the direct deposit, the funds left the employer’s “hands.”  The 
subsequent deposit of those funds into the entireties account 
is precisely the type of indirect transfer covered by the 
PUFTA.  See Cohen v. Sikirica, 487 B.R. at 632; In re 
Arbogast, 466 B.R. at 312.  “A person may not do by 
indirection what he is forbidden to do directly.”  In re Craig, 
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144 F.3d at 592 (quoting Merriam v. Venida Blouse Corp., 23 
F. Supp. 659, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)).   
 
The Wettachs also draw an analogy to an employer 
stopping payment on a check as evidence of retained 
employer control “until the funds are received by the bank.”  
Appellants’ Br. 28.  However, they misstate Pennsylvania 
law.  Pennsylvania requires that a stop-payment notice 
provide “reasonable time for the bank to act,” meaning that 
the ability to stop payment is not absolute until the payment 
of funds.  See 13 Pa. C.S.A. § 4303(a); see also id. § 4403(a).  
Thus, there exists some period of time before the payment of 
funds to the bank where wages are no longer in the 
employer’s “hands,” which is consistent with our analysis. 
 
Accordingly, the Court affirms the district court’s 
holding that the direct deposit of wages into an entireties 
account is a “transfer” of an “asset” under the PUFTA.   
D.  THE WETTACHS HAVE FORFEITED THEIR 
REMAINING ARGUMENTS BY FAILING TO DEVELOP 
THEM IN THEIR OPENING BRIEF 
 
The Wettachs raise two additional arguments in their 
Statement of the Issues Presented.  Appellants’ Br. 1-2.  
However, because they fail to develop either argument in 
their opening brief, the Court holds that the Wettachs have 
forfeited these claims.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 
182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
First, the Wettachs claim that the Trustee “breach[ed] 
his duties to the Court by failing to offer Exhibit 23 into the 
record[.]”  Appellants’ Br. 1-2.  But as the Trustee correctly 
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notes, Appellee’s Br. 2, the Wettachs provide no support for 
this position either in their opening brief or on reply.  The 
Wettachs have therefore forfeited the argument.  See Kost, 1 
F.3d at 182. 
 
Second, the Wettachs argue that the bankruptcy court 
“err[ed] in its ‘finding’ that no deposits were placed in the 
entireties account except Thomas Wettach’s” wages.  
Appellants’ Br. 2.  Yet again the Wettachs provide no 
substantive argument on this issue in their opening brief, 
instead addressing it for the first time on reply.  See 
Appellants’ Reply Br. 5; see also Appellee’s Br. 2 (noting the 
omission from the Wettachs’ opening brief).  These 
arguments come too late to avoid forfeiture.  See In re 
Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003).  Regardless, the 
record supports the bankruptcy court’s finding that the only 
recoverable deposits into the entireties account during the 
lookback period were Thomas Wettach’s wages.  See In re 
Wettach, 489 B.R. at 512-13; App. 332:12-333:5, 375:10-:12. 
 
 We therefore decline to reach these two issues, and 
affirm the district court’s order. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court affirms the 
order of the district court affirming the decision of the 
bankruptcy court. 
